

VIRGINIA:

BEFORE THE VIRGINIA STATE BAR DISCIPLINARY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF
PETER ROBIN ESTES

VSB Docket No. 19-000-114800

RULE TO SHOW CAUSE
AND
ORDER OF SUMMARY SUSPENSION AND HEARING

It appearing to the Board that Respondent Peter Robin Estes (hereinafter "Respondent") was licensed to practice law within the Commonwealth of Virginia on October 5, 1982.

It further appearing to the Board that Respondent Peter Robin Estes has been disbarred from the practice of law in California, by Order from the Supreme Court of California.

It further appearing to the Board that such disciplinary action has become final.

Upon consideration whereof, it is ORDERED, pursuant to *Rules of Virginia Supreme Court*, Part Six, Section IV, Paragraph 13-24, that the license of Peter Robin Estes to practice law within the Commonwealth of Virginia be, and the same hereby is, suspended effective April 26, 2019.

It is further ORDERED that Respondent Peter Robin Estes shall appear before the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board at the State Corporation Commission, Courtroom B, Second Floor, Tyler Building, 1300 East Main Street, Richmond, VA 23219, at 9:00 a.m. on Friday, May 17, 2019, to show cause why the same discipline that was imposed in the other jurisdiction should not be imposed by the Board.

It is further ORDERED that Respondent Peter Robin Estes shall forthwith give notice, by certified mail, of the suspension of his license to practice law in Virginia to all clients for whom he is currently handling matters and to all opposing attorneys and the presiding judges in pending litigation. The Respondent shall also make appropriate arrangements for the disposition of matters then in his care in conformity with the wishes of his clients. The Respondent shall give such notice within fourteen (14) days of the effective date of the suspension order, and make such arrangements as are required herein within forty-five (45) days of the effective date of the suspension order. The Respondent shall also furnish proof to the bar within sixty (60) days of the effective date of the suspension order that such notices have been timely given and such arrangements for the disposition of matters made. Issues concerning the adequacy of the notice and arrangements required herein shall be determined by the Disciplinary Board, which may impose a sanction of revocation or suspension for failure to comply with the requirements of this subparagraph.


It is further ORDERED that a copy of the October 19, 2015 certified Supreme Court of California Order disbarring Respondent Peter Robin Estes from the practice of law in California, with attached State Bar of California, Decision and Order of Involuntary Inactive Enrollment, dated June 3, 2016, be attached to this Rule to Show Cause and Order of Summary Suspension and Hearing and made a part hereof.

It is further ORDERED that an attested copy of this Rule to Show Cause and Order of Summary Suspension and Hearing, with attachments, shall be mailed to Peter Robin Estes by certified mail at his address of record with the Virginia State Bar, Peter Robin Estes, Esq., 7108 Evanston Road, Springfield, VA 22150-3623, and to Elizabeth K. Shoenfeld, Assistant Bar Counsel, Virginia State Bar, 1111 East Main Street, Suite 700, Richmond, Virginia 23219-0026.

This matter is continued to May 17, 2019 at 9:00 a.m.

Entered: April 19, 2019.

VIRGINIA STATE BAR DISCIPLINARY BOARD



A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Sandra L. Havrilak". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a large, stylized 'S' at the beginning. It is positioned above a horizontal line.

Sandra L. Havrilak, 1st Vice Chair

(State Bar Court Nos. 15-O-10284 (15-O-10290; 15-O-10473;
15-O-10531; 15-O-10801))

S236706

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

En Banc

SUPREME COURT
FILED

OCT 19 2016

In re PETER ROBIN ESTES on Discipline

Jorge Navarrete Clerk

Deputy

The court orders that Peter Robin Estes, State Bar Number 168867, is disbarred from the practice of law in California and that his name is stricken from the roll of attorneys.

Peter Robin Estes must also comply with California Rules of Court, rule 9.20, and perform the acts specified in subdivisions (a) and (c) of that rule within 30 and 40 calendar days, respectively, after the effective date of this order.

Costs are awarded to the State Bar in accordance with Business and Professions Code section 6086.10 and are enforceable both as provided in Business and Professions Code section 6140.7 and as a money judgment.

RECEIVED

FEB 12 2019

VSB CLERK'S OFFICE

I, Jorge Navarrete, Clerk of the Supreme Court of the State of California, do hereby certify that the preceding is a true copy of an order of this Court as shown by the records of my office.

Witness my hand and the seal of the Court this

day of OCT 19 2016 2016

Month

By:

Deputy

CANTIL-SAKAUYE

Chief Justice

kwiktag # 211 098 124



PUBLIC MATTER

STATE BAR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
HEARING DEPARTMENT - LOS ANGELES

FILED

JUN 03 2016

STATE BAR COURT
CLERK'S OFFICE
LOS ANGELES

In the Matter of) Case Nos.: 15-O-10284-WKM (15-O-10290;
PETER ROBIN ESTES,) 15-O-10473; 15-O-10531;
Member No. 168867,) 15-O-10801)
A Member of the State Bar.)) DECISION AND ORDER OF INVOLUNTARY
) INACTIVE ENROLLMENT
)

Respondent Peter Robin Estes (respondent) is charged with a total of twenty counts of misconduct in five separate client matters. He failed to participate either in person or through counsel, and his default was entered. The Office of the Chief Trial Counsel of the State Bar of California (OCTC) filed a petition for disbarment under rule 5.85 of the Rules of Procedure of the State Bar.¹

Rule 5.85 provides the procedure to follow when an attorney fails to participate in a disciplinary proceeding after receiving adequate notice and opportunity. The rule provides that, if an attorney's default is entered for failing to respond to the notice of disciplinary charges (NDC) and the attorney fails to have the default set aside or vacated within 90 days, OCTC will file a petition requesting the court to recommend the attorney's disbarment.²

¹ Unless otherwise indicated, all references to rules are to this source.

² If the court determines that any due process requirement is not satisfied, including adequate notice to the attorney, it must deny the petition for disbarment and take other appropriate action to ensure that the matter is promptly resolved. (Rule 5.85(F)(2).)

In the instant case, the court concludes that the requirements of rule 5.85 have been satisfied and that the petition for disbarment should be granted. Accordingly, the court will recommend that respondent be disbarred from the practice of law.

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

Jurisdiction

Respondent was admitted to the practice of law in this state on December 13, 1993. Since that date, he has continuously been a member of the State Bar of California.

Procedural Requirements Have Been Satisfied

On August 25, 2015, OCTC filed and properly served the NDC on respondent by certified mail, return receipt requested, at respondent's membership records address. The NDC notified respondent that his failure to participate in the proceeding would result in a disbarment recommendation. (Rule 5.41.) On October 2, 2015, the United States Postal Service returned the NDC to OCTC undelivered and marked: "Return to Sender-Unclaimed-Unable to forward" Nonetheless, the record is clear that respondent had actual notice of this proceeding no later than September 15, 2015, when he spoke on the telephone with the trial counsel assigned to this matter, Deputy Trial Counsel Lara Bairamian (DTC Bairamian).

On September 22, 2015, respondent met with DTC Bairamian in the State Bar's Los Angeles office. At that meeting, DTC Bairamian not only provided respondent with a courtesy copy of the NDC in this matter, but also notified respondent that the matter had been set for an initial status conference on October 9, 2015. DTC Bairamian also advised respondent that she would seek his default if he did not promptly file a response to the NDC.

On October 6 and 9, 2015, respondent and DTC Bairamian again spoke on the telephone. During their October 6 conversation, respondent provided DTC Bairamian with an alternative mailing address in Accokeek, Maryland where courtesy copies of pleadings could be sent to him.

During their October 9 conversation, DTC Bairamian told respondent that, because he had not filed a response to the NDC, she intended to seek the entry of his default the following week. She also notified respondent that this proceeding had been set for another status conference on October 20, 2015.

On October 12, 2015, DTC Bairamian received an email from respondent. Attached to that email was a letter from respondent stating that he elects "to resolve this matter by default." Thereafter, respondent failed to file a response to the NDC. On October 16, 2015, OCTC filed and properly served a motion for entry of default on respondent at his membership-records address by certified mail, return receipt requested. In addition, OCTC mailed a courtesy copy of the motion to respondent at his alternative address in Accokeek, Maryland. The motion complied with the requirements for a default, including a supporting declaration from DTC Bairamian. (Rule 5.80.) The motion notified respondent that, if he did not timely move to set aside his default, the court would recommend his disbarment.

Respondent did not file a response to the NDC or to the motion for entry of default, and the court properly entered his default on November 3, 2015. The court properly served the default order on respondent at his membership records address by certified mail, return receipt requested. The court also sent a courtesy copy of its default order to respondent at his alternative address in Accokeek, Maryland by first class mail, regular delivery.

In the default order, the court advised respondent that, if he did not timely move to set aside his default, the court would recommend that he be disbarred. In the default order, the court also ordered that respondent be involuntarily enrolled as an inactive member of the State Bar of California in accordance with Business and Professions Code section 6007, subdivision (e).³

³ Unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory references are to the Business and Professions Code.

Thereafter, on November 6, 2015, respondent was involuntarily enrolled inactive, and he has been involuntarily enrolled inactive since that time.

The default order that was served on respondent at his membership records address was returned to the court undelivered. However, the courtesy copy of the default order sent to respondent's alternative address in Accokeek, Maryland was not returned to the court.

Respondent did not seek to have his default set aside or vacated. (Rule 5.83(C)(1) [attorney has 90 days to file motion to set aside default].) Thus, on February 26, 2016, OCTC filed and properly served the petition for disbarment on respondent at his membership records address by certified mail, return receipt requested. In addition, OCTC mailed a courtesy copy of the petition to respondent at respondent's alternative address in Accokeek, Maryland.

As required by rule 5.85(A), OCTC reported in the petition that (1) respondent had not contacted OCTC since his default was entered on November 3, 2015; (2) in addition to the present case, 20 other disciplinary matters are pending against respondent; (3) respondent has one prior record of discipline; and (4) the Client Security Fund has not made any payments resulting from respondent's prior discipline. Respondent did not respond to the petition for disbarment or move to set aside or vacate the default. The case was submitted for decision on March 23, 2016.

Prior Record of Discipline

Respondent has one prior record of discipline for misconduct committed between about March 2013 and September 2014.⁴ On May 7, 2015, the Supreme Court filed an order in case number S224906 (State Bar Court case number 14-O-00858, etc.), entitled *In re Peter Robin Estes on Discipline*, placing respondent on one year's stayed suspension and two years'

⁴The court admits into evidence the certified copy of respondent's prior record of discipline, which is attached as Exhibit 1 to DTC Bairamian's declaration that is included in OCTC's February 26, 2016, petition for disbarment.

probation on conditions, including a 90-day suspension. The Supreme Court imposed that discipline on respondent because respondent stipulated to culpability on the following fourteen counts of misconduct in six separate client matters: one count of failure to perform legal services competently; six counts of charging and collecting illegal fees; one count of misleading advertising; five counts of engaging in the unauthorized practice of law in various sister states; and one count of offering to settle a client's legal malpractice claim against him without advising the client of the right to seek independent legal advice.

The Factual Allegations Deemed Admitted by Default Warrant the Imposition of Discipline

Under section 6088 and rule 5.82, the factual allegations (but not the charges or the conclusions of law) set forth in the NDC are deemed admitted by the entry of respondent's default. When ruling on OCTC's petition for disbarment, the court must determine whether the admitted factual allegations support a finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that respondent is culpable of the charged misconduct. (Rule 5.85(F)(1)(d); cf. *In the Matter of Blum* (Review Dept. 2002) 4 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 403, 409, 410.) When making that determination, the court must resolve all reasonable doubts in respondent's favor, just as the court would do if this were a contested disciplinary proceeding. (*In the Matter of Heiser* (Review Dept. 1990) 1 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 47, 54-55, citing *Ballard v. State Bar* (1983) 35 Cal.3d 274, 291.) As set forth in greater detail *post*, the admitted factual allegations support a finding that that respondent is culpable of the misconduct charged in 10 of the 20 counts. Therefore, the factual allegations in the NDC admitted by default "support a finding that [respondent] violated a statute, rule or court order that would warrant the imposition of discipline." (Rule 5.85(F)(1)(d).)

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Case Number 15-O-10284 (Furtado Matter)

Count One – Respondent willfully violated Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 1-300(B) (prohibition on practicing law in another jurisdiction in violation of that jurisdiction's professional regulations) by engaging in the practice of law in Massachusetts in violation of the Massachusetts Rules of Professional Conduct.

Count Two – This charge is that, “On or about February 24, 2014, Respondent made a solicitation, *or allowed one to be made on Respondent's behalf by agents of his law firm, 'Estes Law,'* to Orminda Furtado, a prospective client, by communication delivered by telephone to a person whom Respondent or Estes Law had no family or prior professional relationship concerning Respondent's availability for professional employment with a significant motive of pecuniary gain, in willful violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 1-400(C).” (Italics added.)

First, count two does not contain sufficient factual allegations to give respondent or the court adequate notice of the charges against respondent. Due process mandates that OCTC allege, in the NDC, sufficient specific factual detail to provide respondent with “ ‘a reasonable opportunity to prepare and present his defense and not be taken by surprise by evidence offered at his trial’ [Citation.] ” (*In the Matter of Glasser* (Review Dept. 1990) 1 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 163, 168.) Without question, attorneys in State Bar Court disciplinary proceedings are to “be given fair, adequate, and reasonable notice and have a fair, adequate, and reasonable opportunity and right ... [t]o defend against the charges” (§ 6085.)⁵ Second, the factual allegations in count two that are deemed admitted by respondent's default do not support a finding that respondent is culpable of violating rule 1-400(C) in the Furtado matter.

⁵ In 1999, the Legislature twice inserted the phrase “fair, adequate, and” into section 6085. Once before the term “reasonable notice,” and once before the term “reasonable opportunity.”

Because all reasonable doubts in an attorney disciplinary proceeding must be resolved in favor of the attorney, a disjunctive allegation of misconduct deemed admitted by the entry of the attorney's default establishes only the lesser of the allegations. (*In the Matter of Heiser* (Review Dept. 1990) 1 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 47, 54 [disjunctive allegations of misconduct deemed admitted by default did not and could not establish culpability for misappropriating client funds, but could and did establish the lesser offense of commingling/use of trust account for personal purposes]; cf. *In the Matter of Freydl* (Review Dept. 2001) 4 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 349, 359 [in an expedited proceeding based on discipline imposed by federal government or sister state under section 6049.1, the court accepts as established only the lesser of the charges in each count].)

The admitted disjunctive allegations in count two establish only that respondent somehow, and possibly unknowingly, allowed agents of his law firm to make a solicitation to Furtado. However, an attorney may ordinarily be disciplined for his employee's or agent's improper solicitation of a prospective client only if the attorney had actual knowledge of the improper solicitations. Thus, a finding that an attorney should have known of his employee's or agent's improper solicitations "is insufficient to warrant discipline for a wilful breach of the rules of professional conduct. (See Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6077.)" (*Geffen v. State Bar* (1975) 14 Cal.3d 843, 856, fn. 4.)

The admitted allegation that respondent somehow "allowed [a solicitation] to be made on Respondent's behalf by agents of his law firm," does not clearly establish that respondent had actual knowledge of the agents' alleged improper solicitation to Furtado. Thus, count two is DISMISSED with prejudice for want of proof.

Count Three – This charge is that respondent willfully violated Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 4-200(A) (illegal fee) by charging and collecting from Furtado a fee of \$3,000 that was illegal because respondent was not entitle to practice law in Massachusetts. The factual

allegations in count three that are deemed admitted by respondent's default do not support the conclusion that respondent is culpable of violating rule 4-200(A) in the Furtado matter. Even though rule 4-200(A) pertains only to "Fees for Legal Services," count three does not even allege that the \$3,000 fee that respondent charged and collected from Furtado was a fee for legal services. Nor does count three even allege that the \$3,000 fee was for respondent's negotiating and obtaining a mortgage-loan modification on Furtado's Massachusetts property. Thus, count three is DISMISSED with prejudice for want of proof.

Count Four – Respondent willfully violated section 6068, subdivision (i) (failing to cooperate/participate in a disciplinary investigation) by failing to respond to the State Bar's two April 2015 letters regarding its investigation of the Furtado matter.

Case Number 15-O-10290 (Webb/Murillo Matter)

Count Five – Respondent willfully violated rule 1-300(B) of the Rules of Professional Conduct by engaging in the practice of law in Missouri in violation of the Missouri Rules of Professional Conduct.

Count Six – This charge is that, "In or about December 2013, Respondent made a solicitation, *or allowed one to be made on Respondent's behalf by agents of his law firm, 'Estes Law,'* to Jerry Webb and Kathleen Murillo, prospective clients, by communication delivered by telephone to a person whom Respondent or Estes Law had no family or prior professional relationship concerning Respondent's availability for professional employment with a significant motive of pecuniary gain in willful violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 1-400(C)." (Italics added.) Like count two *ante*, count six does not contain sufficient factual allegations to give respondent or the court adequate notice of the charges against respondent. Moreover, for the same reasons set forth *ante* under count two, the factual allegations in count six that are deemed admitted by respondent's default do not support the conclusion that

respondent is culpable of violating rule 1-400(C) in the Webb/Murillo matter. Thus, count six is DISMISSED with prejudice for want of proof.

Count Seven – This charge is that respondent willfully violated Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 4-200(A) by charging and collecting from Webb and Murillo a fee of \$3,000 that was illegal because respondent was not entitled to practice law in Missouri. For the same reasons set forth *ante* under count three, the factual allegations in count seven that are deemed admitted by respondent's default do not support the conclusion that respondent is culpable of violating rule 4-200(A) in the Webb/Murillo matter. Count seven is DISMISSED with prejudice for want of proof.

Count Eight – Respondent willfully violated section 6068, subdivision (i) by failing to respond to the State Bar's two April 2015 letters regarding its investigation of the Webb/Murillo matter.

Case Number 15-O-10473 (Mettrakas Matter)

Count Nine – Respondent willfully violated rule 1-300(B) of the Rules of Professional Conduct by engaging in the practice of law in Massachusetts and New Hampshire in violation of the Massachusetts Rules of Professional Conduct and the New Hampshire Rules of Professional Conduct, respectively.

Count Ten – This charge is that, "In or about February 2014, Respondent made a solicitation, *or allowed one to be made on Respondent's behalf by agents of his law firm, 'Estes Law,'* to Charles Mettrakas, a prospective client, by communication delivered by telephone to a person whom Respondent or Estes Law had no family or prior professional relationship concerning Respondent's availability for professional employment with a significant motive of pecuniary gain in willful violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 1-400(C)." (Italics added.) Like counts two and six *ante*, count ten does not contain sufficient factual allegations to

give respondent or the court adequate notice of the charges against respondent. Moreover, for the same reasons set forth *ante* under count two, the factual allegations in count ten that are deemed admitted by respondent's default do not support the conclusion that respondent is culpable of violating Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 1-400(C) in the Metrakas matter. Count ten is DISMISSED with prejudice for want of proof.

Count Eleven – This charge is that respondent willfully violated Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 4-200(A) by charging and collecting from Metrakas a fee of \$12,500 that was illegal because respondent was not entitled to practice law in Massachusetts and New Hampshire. For the same reasons set forth *ante* under count three, the factual allegations in count eleven that are deemed admitted by respondent's default do not support the conclusion that respondent is culpable of violating rule 4-200(A) in the Metrakas matter. Count eleven is DISMISSED with prejudice for want of proof.

Count Twelve – Respondent willfully violated section 6068, subdivision (i) by failing to respond to the State Bar's two April 2015 letters regarding its investigation of the Metrakas matter.

Case Number 15-O-10531 (Williams Matter)

Count Thirteen – Respondent willfully violated rule 1-300(B) of the Rules of Professional Conduct by engaging in the practice of law in Massachusetts in violation of the Massachusetts Rules of Professional Conduct.

Count Fourteen – This charge is that, "In or about December 27, 2013, Respondent made a solicitation, *or allowed one to be made on Respondent's behalf by agents of his law firm, 'Estes Law,'* to Lawrence Williams and Sonia Williams, prospective clients, by communication delivered by telephone to persons whom Respondent or Estes Law had no family or prior professional relationship concerning Respondent's availability for professional employment with

a significant motive of pecuniary gain in willful violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 1-400(C)." (Italics added.) Like counts two, six, and ten *ante*, count fourteen does not contain sufficient factual allegations to give respondent or the court adequate notice of the charges against respondent. Moreover, for the same reasons set forth *ante* under count two, the factual allegations in count fourteen that are deemed admitted by respondent's default do not support the conclusion that respondent is culpable of violating Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 1-400(C) in the Williams matter. Count fourteen is DISMISSED with prejudice for want of proof.

Count Fifteen – This charge is that respondent willfully violated Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 4-200(A) by charging and collecting from Lawrence and Sonia Williams a fee of \$3,000 that was illegal because respondent was not entitled to practice law in Massachusetts. For the same reasons set forth *ante* under count three, the factual allegations in count fifteen that are deemed admitted by respondent's default do not support the conclusion that respondent is culpable of violating rule 4-200(A) in the Williams matter. Count fifteen is DISMISSED with prejudice for want of proof.

Count Sixteen – Respondent willfully violated section 6068, subdivision (i) by failing to respond to the State Bar's two April 2015 letters regarding its investigation of the Williams matter.

Case Number 15-O-10801 (Roten Matter)

Count Seventeen – Respondent willfully violated rule 1-300(B) of the Rules of Professional by engaging in the practice of law in Georgia in violation of the Official Code of Georgia and the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct.

Count Eighteen – This charge is that, "In or about January 2014, Respondent made a solicitation, *or allowed one to be made on Respondent's behalf by agents of his law firm*, 'Estes

Law,' to Johnny Roten, a prospective client, by communication delivered by telephone to persons whom Respondent or Estes Law had no family or prior professional relationship concerning Respondent's availability for professional employment with a significant motive of pecuniary gain in willful violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 1-400(C)." (Italics added.) Like counts two, six, ten, and fourteen *ante*, count eighteen does not contain sufficient factual allegations to give respondent or the court adequate notice of the charges against respondent. Moreover, for the same reasons set forth *ante* under count two, the factual allegations in count fourteen that are deemed admitted by respondent's default do not support the conclusion that respondent is culpable of violating Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 1-400(C) in the Williams matter. Count eighteen is DISMISSED with prejudice for want of proof.

Count Nineteen – This charge is that respondent willfully violated Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 4-200(A) by charging and collecting from Roten a fee of \$3,000 that was illegal because respondent was not entitled to practice law in Georgia. For the same reasons set forth *ante* under count three, the factual allegations in count nineteen that are deemed admitted by respondent's default do not support the conclusion that respondent is culpable of violating rule 4-200(A) in the Roten matter. Count nineteen is DISMISSED with prejudice for want of proof.

Count Twenty – Respondent willfully violated section 6068, subdivision (i) by failing to respond to the State Bar's two April 2015 letters regarding its investigation of the Roten matter.

Disbarment is Recommended

In light of the foregoing, the court finds that the requirements of rule 5.85(F) have been satisfied and that it is appropriate to recommend respondent's disbarment. In particular:

- (1) the NDC was properly served on respondent under rule 5.25;
- (2) respondent had actual notice of this proceeding before the entry of his default;
- (3) respondent's default was properly entered under rule 5.80; and

(4) the factual allegations in the NDC deemed admitted by the entry of respondent's default support a finding that respondent violated a statute, rule or court order that would warrant the imposition of discipline.

Despite actual notice and opportunity, respondent failed to participate in this disciplinary proceeding. As set forth in the Rules of Procedure of the State Bar, the court will recommend disbarment.

RECOMMENDATION

Disbarment

The court recommends that respondent Peter Robin Estes be disbarred from the practice of law in the State of California and that his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys.

California Rules of Court, Rule 9.20

The court further recommends that respondent be ordered to comply with the requirements of California Rules of Court, rule 9.20 and to perform the acts specified in subdivisions (a) and (c) of that rule within 30 and 40 days, respectively, after the effective date of the Supreme Court order in this proceeding.

Costs

The court further recommends that costs be awarded to the State Bar in accordance with Business and Professions Code section 6086.10 and that the costs be enforceable both as provided in Business and Professions Code section 6140.7 and as a money judgment.

ORDER OF INVOLUNTARY INACTIVE ENROLLMENT

In accordance with Business and Professions Code section 6007, subdivision (c)(4), the court orders that Peter Robin Estes, State Bar number 168867, be involuntarily enrolled as an

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inactive member of the State Bar of California, effective three calendar days after the service of this decision and order by mail. (Rule 5.111(D).)

Dated: June 3, 2016.



W. KEARSE MCGILL
Judge of the State Bar Court

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

[Rules Proc. of State Bar; Rule 5.27(B); Code Civ. Proc., § 1013a(4)]

I am a Case Administrator of the State Bar Court of California. I am over the age of eighteen and not a party to the within proceeding. Pursuant to standard court practice, in the City and County of Los Angeles, on June 3, 2016, I deposited a true copy of the following document(s):

DECISION AND ORDER OF INVOLUNTARY INACTIVE ENROLLMENT

in a sealed envelope for collection and mailing on that date as follows:

by first-class mail, with postage thereon fully prepaid, through the United States Postal Service at Los Angeles, California, addressed as follows:

PETER R. ESTES
3658 BARHAM BLVD P221
LOS ANGELES, CA 90068


Courtesy copy:

PETER ROBIN ESTES
15601 FARMINGTON COURT
ACCOKEEK, MD 20607

by interoffice mail through a facility regularly maintained by the State Bar of California addressed as follows:

Alex J. Hackert, Enforcement, Los Angeles

I hereby certify that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed in Los Angeles, California, on June 3, 2016.



Julieta E. Gonzales
Case Administrator
State Bar Court

1 STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA
2 OFFICE OF THE CHIEF TRIAL COUNSEL
2 JAYNE KIM, No. 174614
3 CHIEF TRIAL COUNSEL
3 JOSEPH R. CARLUCCI, No. 172309
4 DEPUTY CHIEF TRIAL COUNSEL
4 MELANIE J. LAWRENCE, No. 230102
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7 Los Angeles, California 90017-2515
8 Telephone: (213) 765-1338

FILED

AUG 25 2015

STATE BAR COURT
CLERK'S OFFICE
LOS ANGELES

10 STATE BAR COURT
11 HEARING DEPARTMENT - LOS ANGELES
12

13 In the Matter of:) Case No. 15-O-10284, 15-O-10290,
14 PETER ROBIN ESTES,) 15-O-10473, 15-O-10531, 15-O-10801
15 No. 168867,) NOTICE OF DISCIPLINARY CHARGES
16 A Member of the State Bar.)

17 **NOTICE - FAILURE TO RESPOND!**
18

19 IF YOU FAIL TO FILE A WRITTEN ANSWER TO THIS NOTICE
20 WITHIN 20 DAYS AFTER SERVICE, OR IF YOU FAIL TO APPEAR AT
21 THE STATE BAR COURT TRIAL:

22 (1) YOUR DEFAULT WILL BE ENTERED;
23 (2) YOUR STATUS WILL BE CHANGED TO INACTIVE AND YOU
24 WILL NOT BE PERMITTED TO PRACTICE LAW;
25 (3) YOU WILL NOT BE PERMITTED TO PARTICIPATE FURTHER IN
26 THESE PROCEEDINGS UNLESS YOU MAKE A TIMELY MOTION
27 AND THE DEFAULT IS SET ASIDE, AND;
28 (4) YOU SHALL BE SUBJECT TO ADDITIONAL DISCIPLINE.
29 SPECIFICALLY, IF YOU FAIL TO TIMELY MOVE TO SET ASIDE
30 OR VACATE YOUR DEFAULT, THIS COURT WILL ENTER AN
31 ORDER RECOMMENDING YOUR DISBARMENT WITHOUT
32 FURTHER HEARING OR PROCEEDING. SEE RULE 5.80 ET SEQ.,
33 RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA.

1 The State Bar of California alleges:

2 JURISDICTION

3 1. Peter Robin Estes ("respondent") was admitted to the practice of law in the State of
4 California on December 13, 1993, was a member at all times pertinent to these charges, and is
5 currently a member of the State Bar of California.

6 COUNT ONE

7 Case No. 15-O-10284

8 Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1-300(B)
[Unauthorized Practice of Law in Other Jurisdiction]

9 2. From on or about February 24, 2014, through in or about May 2014, Respondent held
10 himself out as entitled to practice law and practiced law in Massachusetts by accepting
11 employment with Orminda Furtado in order to perform legal services in connection with
12 negotiating and obtaining a mortgage loan modification for a property located in Massachusetts
13 when he was not licensed in that jurisdiction and to do so was in violation of the regulations of
14 the profession in Massachusetts, namely Massachusetts Rules of Professional Conduct, rule
15 5.5(b), in willful violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 1-300(B).

16 COUNT TWO

17 Case No. 15-O-10284

18 Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1-400(C)
[Solicitation of a Prospective Client]

19 20 3. On or about February 24, 2014, Respondent made a solicitation, or allowed one to be
21 made on Respondent's behalf by agents of his law firm, "Estes Law," to Orminda Furtado, a
22 prospective client, by communication delivered by telephone to a person whom Respondent or
23 Estes Law had no family or prior professional relationship concerning Respondent's availability
24 for professional employment with a significant motive of pecuniary gain, in willful violation of
25 the Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 1-400(C).

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28

COUNT THREE

Case No. 15-O-10284

**Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 4-200(A)
[Illegal Fee]**

4. Between on or about February 28, 2014, and on or about May 13, 2014, Respondent charged and collected from Orminda Furtado a fee of \$3,000 that was illegal because Respondent was not entitled to practice law in Massachusetts, in willful violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 4-200(A).

COUNT FOUR

Case No. 15-O-10284

Case No. 15-01625
Business and Professions Code, section 6068(i)
[Failure to Cooperate in State Bar Investigation]

11 5. Respondent failed to cooperate and participate in a disciplinary investigation pending
12 against Respondent by failing to provide a substantive response to the State Bar's letters of April
13 10, 2015, and April 24, 2015, which Respondent received, that requested Respondent's response
14 to the allegations of misconduct being investigated in case no. 15-O-10284, in willful violation
15 of Business and Professions Code, section 6068(i).

COUNT FIVE

Case No. 15-O-10290

Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1-300(B)
[Unauthorized Practice of Law in Other Jurisdiction]

6. From in or about December 2013, through in or about April 2014, Respondent held himself out as entitled to practice law and practiced law in Missouri by accepting employment with Jerry Webb and Kathleen Murillo in order to perform legal services in connection with negotiating and obtaining a mortgage loan modification for a property located in Missouri when he was not licensed in that jurisdiction and to do so was in violation of the regulations of the profession in Missouri, namely Missouri Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 4-5.5(b), in willful violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 1-300(B).

COUNT SIX

Case No. 15-O-10290
Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1-400(C)
[Solicitation of a Prospective Client]

7. In or about December 2013, Respondent made a solicitation, or allowed one to be made on Respondent's behalf by agents of his law firm, "Estes Law," to Jerry Webb and Kathleen Murillo, prospective clients, by communication delivered by telephone to a person whom Respondent or Estes Law had no family or prior professional relationship concerning Respondent's availability for professional employment with a significant motive of pecuniary gain, in willful violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 1-400(C).

COUNT SEVEN

Case No. 15-O-10290
Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 4-200(A)
[Illegal Fee]

8. Between on or about February 12, 2014, and on or about April 18, 2014, Respondent charged and collected from Jerry Webb and Kathleen Murillo a fee of \$3,000 that was illegal because Respondent was not entitled to practice law in Missouri, in willful violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 4-200(A).

COUNT EIGHT

Case No. 15-O-10290
Business and Professions Code, section 6068(i)
[Failure to Cooperate in State Bar Investigation]

9. Respondent failed to cooperate and participate in a disciplinary investigation pending against Respondent by failing to provide a substantive response to the State Bar's letters of April 10, 2015, and April 24, 2015, which Respondent received, that requested Respondent's response to the allegations of misconduct being investigated in case no. 15-O-10290, in willful violation of Business and Professions Code, section 6068(i).

COUNT NINE

Case No. 15-O-10473

**Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1-300(B)
[Unauthorized Practice of Law in Other Jurisdiction]**

5 10. From in or about February 2014, through in or about April 2014, Respondent held
himself out as entitled to practice law and practiced law in Massachusetts and New Hampshire
6 by accepting employment with Charles Metrakas in order to perform legal services in connection
7 with negotiating and obtaining a mortgage loan modification for properties located in
8 Massachusetts and New Hampshire when he was not licensed in those jurisdictions and to do so
9 was in violation of the regulations of the profession in Massachusetts and New Hampshire,
10 namely Massachusetts Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 5.5(b) and New Hampshire Rules of
11 Professional Conduct, rule 5.5(b), in willful violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, rule
12 1-300(B).

COUNT TEN

Case No. 15-O-10473

Case No. 15-O-10473
Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1-400(C)
[Solicitation of a Prospective Client]

17 11. In or about February 2014, Respondent made a solicitation, or allowed one to be
18 made on Respondent's behalf by agents of his law firm, "Estes Law," to Charles Metrakas, a
19 prospective client, by communication delivered by telephone to a person whom Respondent or
20 Estes Law had no family or prior professional relationship concerning Respondent's availability
21 for professional employment with a significant motive of pecuniary gain, in willful violation of
22 the Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 1-400(C).

COUNT ELEVEN

Case No. 15-O-10473

Case No. 15-31873
Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 4-200(A)
[Illegal Fee]

26 12. Between on or about March 5, 2014, and on or about April 8, 2014, Respondent
27 charged and collected from Charles Metrakas a fee of \$12,500 that was illegal because

1 Respondent was not entitled to practice law in Massachusetts and New Hampshire, in willful
2 violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 4-200(A).

3 COUNT TWELVE

4 Case No. 15-O-10473

5 Business and Professions Code, section 6068(i)
[Failure to Cooperate in State Bar Investigation]

6 13. Respondent failed to cooperate and participate in a disciplinary investigation pending
7 against Respondent by failing to provide a substantive response to the State Bar's letters of April
8 10, 2015, and April 24, 2015, which Respondent received, that requested Respondent's response
9 to the allegations of misconduct being investigated in case no. 15-O-10473, in willful violation
10 of Business and Professions Code, section 6068(i).

11 COUNT THIRTEEN

12 Case No. 15-O-10531

13 Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1-300(B)
[Unauthorized Practice of Law in Other Jurisdiction]

14 14. From on or about December 27, 2013, through in or about February 2014,
15 Respondent held himself out as entitled to practice law and practiced law in Massachusetts by
16 accepting employment with Lawrence Williams and Sonia Williams in order to perform legal
17 services in connection with negotiating and obtaining a mortgage loan modification for a
18 property located in Massachusetts when he was not licensed in that jurisdiction and to do so was
19 in violation of the regulations of the profession in Massachusetts, namely Massachusetts Rules of
20 Professional Conduct, rule 5.5(b), in willful violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, rule
21 1-300(B).

22 COUNT FOURTEEN

23 Case No. 15-O-10531

24 Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1-400(C)
[Solicitation of a Prospective Client]

25 15. On or about December 27, 2013, Respondent made a solicitation, or allowed one to
26 be made on Respondent's behalf by agents of his law firm, "Estes Law," to Lawrence Williams
27

1 and Sonia Williams, prospective clients, by communication delivered by telephone to persons
2 whom Respondent or Estes Law had no family or prior professional relationship concerning
3 Respondent's availability for professional employment with a significant motive of pecuniary
4 gain, in willful violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 1-400(C).

5 COUNT FIFTEEN

6 Case No. 15-O-10531
7 Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 4-200(A)
[Illegal Fee]

8 16. Between on or about January 8, 2014, and on or about February 10, 2014, Respondent
9 charged and collected from Lawrence Williams and Sonia Williams a fee of \$3,000 that was
10 illegal because Respondent was not entitled to practice law in Massachusetts, in willful violation
11 of the Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 4-200(A).

12 COUNT SIXTEEN

13 Case No. 15-O-10531
14 Business and Professions Code, section 6068(i)
[Failure to Cooperate in State Bar Investigation]

15 17. Respondent failed to cooperate and participate in a disciplinary investigation pending
16 against Respondent by failing to provide a substantive response to the State Bar's letters of April
17 10, 2015, and April 24, 2015, which Respondent received, that requested Respondent's response
18 to the allegations of misconduct being investigated in case no. 15-O-10531, in willful violation
19 of Business and Professions Code, section 6068(i).

20 COUNT SEVENTEEN

21 Case No. 15-O-10801
22 Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1-300(B)
[Unauthorized Practice of Law in Other Jurisdiction]

23 18. From in or about January 2014, through in or about April 2014, Respondent held
24 himself out as entitled to practice law and practiced law in Georgia by accepting employment
25 with Johnny Roten in order to perform legal services in connection with negotiating and
26 obtaining a mortgage loan modification for a property located in Georgia when he was not
27 licensed in that jurisdiction and to do so was in violation of the regulations of the profession in
28

1 Georgia, namely Official Code of Georgia Annotated section 15-19-51 and Georgia Rules of
2 Professional Conduct, rule 5.5(a), in willful violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, rule
3 1-300(B).

4 COUNT EIGHTEEN

5 Case No. 15-O-10801
6 Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1-400(C)
7 [Solicitation of a Prospective Client]

8 19. In or about January 2014, Respondent made a solicitation, or allowed one to be made
9 on Respondent's behalf by agents of his law firm, "Estes Law," to Johnny Roten, a prospective
10 client, by communication delivered by telephone to a person whom Respondent or Estes Law
11 had no family or prior professional relationship concerning Respondent's availability for
12 professional employment with a significant motive of pecuniary gain, in willful violation of the
13 Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 1-400(C).

14 COUNT NINETEEN

15 Case No. 15-O-10801
16 Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 4-200(A)
17 [Illegal Fee]

18 20. Between on or about February 10, 2014, and on or about April 14, 2014, Respondent
19 charged and collected from Johnny Roten a fee of \$3,000 that was illegal because Respondent
20 was not entitled to practice law in Georgia, in willful violation of the Rules of Professional
21 Conduct, rule 4-200(A).

22 COUNT TWENTY

23 Case No. 15-O-10801
24 Business and Professions Code, section 6068(i)
25 [Failure to Cooperate in State Bar Investigation]

26 21. Respondent failed to cooperate and participate in a disciplinary investigation pending
27 against Respondent by failing to provide a substantive response to the State Bar's letters of April
28 10, 2015, and April 24, 2015, which Respondent received, that requested Respondent's response
to the allegations of misconduct being investigated in case no. 15-O-10801, in willful violation
of Business and Professions Code, section 6068(i).

NOTICE - INACTIVE ENROLLMENT!

YOU ARE HEREBY FURTHER NOTIFIED THAT IF THE STATE BAR COURT FINDS, PURSUANT TO BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONS CODE SECTION 6007(c), THAT YOUR CONDUCT POSES A SUBSTANTIAL THREAT OF HARM TO THE INTERESTS OF YOUR CLIENTS OR TO THE PUBLIC, YOU MAY BE INVOLUNTARILY ENROLLED AS AN INACTIVE MEMBER OF THE STATE BAR. YOUR INACTIVE ENROLLMENT WOULD BE IN ADDITION TO ANY DISCIPLINE RECOMMENDED BY THE COURT.

NOTICE - COST ASSESSMENT!

IN THE EVENT THESE PROCEDURES RESULT IN PUBLIC DISCIPLINE, YOU MAY BE SUBJECT TO THE PAYMENT OF COSTS INCURRED BY THE STATE BAR IN THE INVESTIGATION, HEARING AND REVIEW OF THIS MATTER PURSUANT TO BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONS CODE SECTION 6086.10.

Respectfully submitted,

THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF TRIAL COUNSEL

DATED: August 25, 2015

By:

Lara Bairamian
Deputy Trial Counsel

DECLARATION OF SERVICE BY CERTIFIED MAIL

CASE NUMBER: 15-O-10284; 15-O-10290; 15-O-10473; 15-O-10531; 15-O-10801

I, the undersigned, over the age of eighteen (18) years, whose business address and place of employment is the State Bar of California, 845 South Figueroa Street, Los Angeles, California 90017, declare that I am not a party to the within action; that I am readily familiar with the State Bar of California's practice for collection and processing of correspondence for mailing with the United States Postal Service; that in the ordinary course of the State Bar of California's practice, correspondence collected and processed by the State Bar of California would be deposited with the United States Postal Service that same day; that I am aware that on motion of party served, service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation date or postage meter date on the envelope or package is more than one day after date of deposit for mailing contained in the affidavit; and that in accordance with the practice of the State Bar of California for collection and processing of mail, I deposited or placed for collection and mailing in the City and County of Los Angeles, on the date shown below, a true copy of the within

NOTICE OF DISCIPLINARY CHARGES

in a sealed envelope placed for collection and mailing as certified mail, return receipt requested, Article No.: 9414 7266 9904 2010 0713 10, at Los Angeles, on the date shown below, addressed to:

**Peter Robin Estes
3658 Barham Blvd. P221
Los Angeles, CA 90068**

in an inter-office mail facility regularly maintained by the State Bar of California addressed to:

NA

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed at Los Angeles, California, on the date shown below.

DATED: August 25, 2015

Signed:

~~Lupe Pacheco~~
Declarant


The document to which this certificate is affixed is a full, true and correct copy of the original on file and of record in the State Bar Court.



ATTEST February 8, 2019

State Bar Court, State Bar of California,
Los Angeles

By Clerk

A handwritten signature in blue ink that reads "Courtney Dette".